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WILLIAM AND MARY TAX CONFERENCE
December 2, 1995
ETHICAL ISSUES IN TAX PRACTICE
Robert I. Brauer
James P. Holden!

I.

SOURCES OF PRACTICE STANDARDS FOR TAX PRACTITIONERS.
A.

THE NATURE OF PRACTICE STANDARDS. Practice standards
are ethical principles that guide the tax practitioner
in balancing duty to client with duty to "system."

B.

WHERE DO WE FIND TAX PRACTICE STANDARDS? Tax practice
standards come from three sources: standards set by
professional organizations, civil penalties set forth
in the Internal Revenue Code, and the Federal
regulations known popularly as "Circular 230."
1.

2.

Standards Set by Professional Organizations.
a.

Both the American Bar Association ("ABA") and
the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA") define standards for
their members. The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct also serve as the basis
for standards set by most court systems,
including the United States Tax Court (Rule
201(a)).

b.

ABA and AICPA committees issue
interpretations of their standards for
particular factual situations.

c.

Other professional organizations, such as the
National Association of Enrolled Agents and
the National Society of Public Accountants
also issue standards for their members.

Internal Revenue Code Civil Penalty Provisions.
These include the income tax return preparer
penalty under section 6694 and the aiding and
abetting penalty under section 6701.

*/L
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Federal regulations known as "Circular 230" (31
CFR Part 10) establish standards for those who
practice before the Internal Revenue Service.

TAX RETURN ACCURACY STANDARDS.

1.

Tax return accuracy standards have been
established for both taxpayers and tax
practitioners.

2.

These standards are fundamental to tax practice,
and we turn to them before considering other
standards.

3.

we commence with the tax return accuracy
obligation of the client taxpayer before
describing the accuracy required of the
practitioner. This order is chosen on the theory
that the practitioner cannot effectively assist
the client unless the practitioner understands
fully the client's own accuracy obligation under
the tax law.

4.

Following that, we return to the accuracy
obligation of the tax practitioner.

THE TAX RETURN ACCURACY OBLIGATION OF THE TAXPAYER CLIENT:
THE TAXPAYER ACCURACY PENALTY.
A.

THE FOUR COMPONENTS OF THE TAXPAYER ACCURACY PENALTY.
A 20% penalty is imposed on any taxpayer whose return
shows an underpayment of tax that is attributable to
one or more of the following four components.
1.

Negligence.

Negligence occurs if a tax return

position lacks reasonable basis or if the taxpayer
does not make a reasonable attempt to comply with
the tax law. Reg. S 1.6662-3(b).
a.

2.

A taxpayer acts reasonably if the taxpayer in
good faith relies on the advice of a tax
professional. Chamberlain v. Commissioner,
No. 94-40806 (5th Cir. 9/27/95).

Disregard of rules or regulations.

Disregard

includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard of the Code, temporary or permanent
regulations, revenue rulings, or notices (other
than notices of proposed rulemaking). Reg. S
1.6662-3(b)(2). A position contrary to a revenue

ruling or notice does not disregard the ruling or
notice if the position has a "realistic
possibility of being sustained on its merits," a
term that we define below.
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Substantial understatement of income tax. A
substantial understatement of income tax occurs
where an income tax underpayment exceeds the
greater of ten percent of the tax due or $5,000
($10,000 for corporation) and the position giving
rise to the underpayment is not supported by
"substantial authority." Section 6662(d).
a.

There is substantial authority for a position
if the weight of authorities supporting the
position is substantial in relation to the
weight of authorities supporting a contrary
position. Reg. S 1.6662-4(d)(2).
(1) There may be substantial authority for
more than one position.
(2) The standard is objective and thus the
taxpayer's belief about the accuracy of
the position is not relevant.
(3) Authorities that may be considered in
evaluating the presence of substantial
authority include essentially all
government-issued material but do not
include privately-issued material such
as treatises, legal periodicals, and
opinions of tax professionals.
(4) If there exists no authority with regard
to a position, substantial authority may
rest on a well-reasoned construction of
the applicable statutory provision.

b.

Determining the existence of substantial
authority in highly factual cases can be
difficult.
(1) In Osteen v. Commissioner, 95 TNT 168-46
(11th Cir. 8/24/95), the Tax Court held
that the taxpayers did not conduct their
horse breeding business for profit and
denied claimed loss deductions. It also
imposed the substantial understatement
penalty on grounds that the claimed
deductions were not supported by
substantial authority.
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(2) The appeals court affirmed on the
substantive tax issue but reversed on
the penalty issue. It held that
substantial authority exists if a
lower-court decision in favor of the
taxpayers would have been affirmed as
not clearly erroneous. The appeals
court concluded that there was evidence
both ways, and the Tax Court could thus
have found for the taxpayers. Had it
done so, its decision would have been
affirmed as not clearly erroneous.
This, said the appeals court, is
sufficient to establish substantial
authority.
c.

If a substantial understatement arises by
virtue of a tax shelter, special rules apply.
Reg. S 1.6662-4(g).
(1) A tax shelter includes any plan or

arrangement having as its principal
purpose the avoidance of Federal income
tax. Reg. S 1.6662-4(g)(2), (3).
(2) A noncorporate taxpayer may avoid the
penalty by showing that there was
substantial authority for the position
and by establishing that the taxpayer
reasonably believed that the position
taken on the return was more likely than
not proper. The taxpayer may establish
the required reasonable belief through
personal analysis of authorities or
reliance on the opinion of a
professional tax advisor. Reg. S
1.6662-4(g).
(3) A corporate taxpayer does not have this
option. Its tax shelter underpayments
are subject to penalty unless relief is
available under the reasonable cause and
good faith exception of section 6664(c),
discussed below. Reg. S
1.6662-4(g)(1)(ii).
4.

Valuation misstatement. There are several
valuation misstatement penalties that apply where
income, pension, and estate or gift tax valuations
exceed stated threshold limits. Section
6662(e),(f), and (g).
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B.

AVOIDING THE PENALTY BY MAKING ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE.
1.

Effect of adeauate disclosure. The taxpayer may
avoid some components of the accuracy penalty by
making adequate disclosure on a Form 8275 (a Form
8275-R must be used if a regulation has been
disregarded).

2.

Reasonable basis reguired. Disclosure is not
effective unless there exists a "reasonable basis"
for the position. Reg. S 1.6662-1.
a.

The precise meaning of "reasonable basis" in
this context is unclear.

b.

While the regulations assert that the
reasonable basis standard is "significantly
higher than the not frivolous standard," they
reserve the actual definition of the term for
future resolution. Reg. S 1.6662-3(b)(3).

3.

The negliQence component. Negligence generally
occurs only where a taxpayer acts without
reasonable basis, and-thus disclosure is not
effective as a defense against this component of
the accuracy penalty. Reg. SS 1.6662-1,
1.6662-7(b).

4.

The disreQard component. The disregard component
of the accuracy penalty may be avoided by
disclosure so long as the taxpayer keeps adequate
books and records and properly substantiates
items. However, if a regulation is disregarded,
disclosure will not be operative unless the
taxpayer is engaged in a good faith challenge to
the validity of the regulation. Reg. S
1.6662-3(c)(1).

5.

The substantial understatement component. The
substantial understatement component of the
accuracy penalty may be avoided by disclosure
except that disclosure will not be effective if
(1) the position-relates to a "tax shelter," or
(2) the taxpayer failed to maintain adequate books
and records or to substantiate items. Reg. S
1.6662-4(e).

6.

The valuation misstatement component. The
valuation misstatement component of the accuracy
penalty may not be avoided by disclosure. Reg. S
1.6662-5(a).

-
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AVOIDING THE PENALTY BY ESTABLISHING REASONABLE CAUSE
AND GOOD FAITH.
1.

The general rule.
a.

The accuracy penalty of section 6662 may not
be imposed if the taxpayer establishes that
there was reasonable cause for the
underpayment and taxpayer acted in good
faith. Section 6664(c); Reg. S 1.6664-4.

b.

The determination of reasonable cause and
good faith is made on the basis of all facts
and circumstances, and the most important
factor is the taxpayer's effort to assess the
proper tax liability. Reg. S 1.6664-4(b).
(1) Reliance on such factors as Forms W-2
and information returns prepared by
others may establish good faith unless
those documents are inconsistent with
other information that is available to
the taxpayer or with the taxpayer's own
knowledge. Reg. S 1.6664-4(b).
(2) Reasonable reliance in good faith on
advice provided by others (including a
tax professional) may suffice if that
advice is based on all pertinent facts
and circumstances and is not based on
unreasonable assumptions. Reg. S
1.6664-4(b),(c).

2.

Special tax shelter rule for corporate taxpayers.
a.

A corporate taxpayer seeking to avoid penalty
with respect to a tax shelter position may
avoid the penalty by establishing reasonable
cause and good faith.

b.

Ordinarily, a corporation would defend
against a penalty by stressing the "legal
justification" that it had for its position.
However, the corporation's legal
justification for a tax shelter position will
be considered only if the taxpayer first
satisfies both an "authority requirement" and
a "belief requirement." Reg. S 1.6664-4(e).
(1) The corporate taxpayer satisfies the
"authority requirement" by establishing
that there was substantial authority for
the position.

-
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The corporate taxpayer satisfies the
"belief requirement" by establishing
that the taxpayer reasonably believed
that there was a greater than 50-percent
likelihood that the position would be
sustained if challenged by the IRS.
This belief may be based on either the
taxpayer's own research or the opinion
of a professional tax advisor.

c.

Once these two requirements are satisfied,
the corporate taxpayer's "legal
justification" may be considered. Reg. S
1.6664-(e)(2).

d.

Even if a corporation satisfies all of the
above requirements, including legal
justification, relief from the penalty may
nonetheless be denied if the circumstances
indicate an absence of good faith (where, for
example, the taxpayer's participation in the
shelter lacked a business purpose, or the
taxpayer claimed benefits that are
unreasonable in relation to its investment).
Reg. S 1.6664-4(e)(3).

NegliQence inconsistent with reasonable cause.
While the reasonable cause exception is
technically available to defend against the
negligence component of the accuracy penalty, that
component of the penalty should not have been
proposed in the first instance if the taxpayer
acted reasonably. Thus, the reasonable cause
exception should not play a role in negligence
situations.

SUMMARY OF THE TAXPAYER ACCURACY STANDARD. The fact
that a taxpayer who acts reasonably is, by reason of
section 6664(c), protected from the accuracy penalty
suggests that the accuracy standard for a taxpayer can
be summarized as a requirement that the taxpayer act
reasonably with respect to the taxpayer's tax
obligations.

III. THE TAX PRACTITIONER'S ACCURACY OBLIGATION.
A.

THE REALISTIC POSSIBILITY STANDARD FOR TAX RETURN
ACCURACY.
1.

The Realistic Possibility Standard.
a.

The prevailing standard requires that
practitioners neither sign returns nor advise
taxpayers to adopt tax return positions

-
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unless those positions have a realistic
possibility of being sustained on the merits.
b.

This standard, known as "the realistic
possibility standard," has been adopted in
the professional organization standards, the
civil penalty provisions, and Circular 230.

2.

Definition of the Realistic Possibility Standard.
Although there is some dispute as to whether this
standard can properly be expressed in percentage
terms, the Service defines the realistic
possibility standard as requiring that a
reasonable and well-informed person, knowledgeable
in the tax law, would, upon analysis, conclude
that the position has approximately a one in
three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained
on its merits. Reg. S 1.6694-2(b).

3.

The Professional Organizations.

4.

a.

ABA Opinion 85-352 and AICPA Statement No. 1
both-adopt "realistic possibility" as the tax
return accuracy standard for their members.

b.

These organizations recognize that a position
need not meet the realistic possibility
standard if the position is not frivolous and
is adequately disclosed on the return.
Similarly, they recognize that a position not
meeting the realistic possibility standard
may be taken or advised in a claim for refund
so long as the position is not frivolous.

The Income Tax Return Preparer Penalty.
a.

The realistic possibility standard governs
the application of the income tax return
preparer penalty of section 6694(a).

b.

Under section 6694(a), a $250 penalty is
imposed on the preparer if an income tax
return understates tax liability and the
understatement is attributable to a position
that fails to meet the realistic possibility
standard.
(1) The penalty does not apply if the
position was adequately disclosed on the
return and is not frivolous (Reg.
§1.6694-2(c)).

-
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(2) It also does not apply if the preparer
establishes that the understatement was
due to reasonable cause. (Reg. S
1.6694-2(d)).
C.

If an income tax return understates liability
by reason of either (1) a willful attempt by
the preparer to understate liability, or (2)
a reckless or intentional disregard of rules
or regulations by the preparer, a $1,000
penalty is imposed on the preparer of that
return. Section 6694(b).
(1) There is no disclosure option where
there has been a willful attempt to
understate liability.
(2) There is, however, a disclosure option
where there has been disregard of rules
or regulations. As with the disregard
component of the taxpayer accuracy
penalty, disclosure is effective where a
regulation has been disregarded only if
the taxpayer is engaged in a good faith
challenge to he validity of the
regulation. Reg. S 1.6694-3(e).
(3) There is no stated exception to the
section 6694(b) penalty for reasonable
cause, but, if the preparer acted
reasonably, the penalty should not have
been asserted.

5.

Circular 230:

Realistic Possibility.

a.

Circular 230 requires that IRS practitioners
observe the realistic possibility standard.
S 10.34. Circular 230 defines the standard
in the same manner as do the preparer penalty
regulations noted above, i.e., as requiring a
one-in-three probability of prevailing.

b.

Circular 230 distinguishes between a signing
practitioner and a nonsigning practitioner
(i.e., a practitioner who advises concerning
a return position or who prepares part of a
return but does not sign the return).
(1) A practitioner may not sign a return
that contains a position that does not
meet the realistic possibility standard
unless the position is not frivolous and
is adequately disclosed on the return.

-
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(2) A nonsigning practitioner may not advise
a position or prepare part of a return
containing a position unless the
position meets the realistic possibility
standard or the position is not
frivolous and the practitioner advises
the taxpayer of the opportunity to avoid
an accuracy penalty through adequate
disclosure.
B.

IV.

THE AIDING AND ABETTING PENALTY APPLICABLE TO
PRACTITIONERS.
1.

The Penalty. Section 6701 imposes a penalty on
any person who assists in the preparation or
presentation of any document knowing (or having
reason to believe) that the document will be used
for tax purposes and who knows that, if used, the
document will result in the understatement of the
tax liability of another person.

2.

Amount. The penalty is $1,000, except that it is
increased to $10,000 if the document relates to
the tax liability of a corporation.

3.

Where applicable. This penalty would apply, for
example, to an individual employed by the taxpayer
who assists in the preparation of a document for
the employer, knowing that the document will
understate the employer's tax liability.

THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
A.

THE GENERAL RULE. Virtually all professional
organizations impose an obligation of confidentiality
on members of the profession with respect to client
affairs. We discuss this ethical obligation
principally in terms of the standards developed for
lawyers because they deal comprehensively with the
subject.

B.

ABA MODEL RULE 1.6. This rule states that a lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to a
representation of a client without the client's consent
except where necessary to prevent the client from
"committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm" or to establish a claim or defense in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client.
1.

The privileQe distinguished. The ethical
obligation of confidentiality is to be
distinguished from the attorney-client privilege,

-
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which is a rule of evidence rather than an ethical
rule.

C.

2.

The privilege is more durable. The
attorney-client privilege is more durable than the
obligation of confidentiality. If appropriately
claimed, the privilege can survive a court order
to testify. In contrast, the ethical obligation
ends whenever the practitioner encounters a legal
obligation to make disclosure.

3.

The privilege is narrower. The attorney-client
privilege is narrow and is available for only a
limited class of communications. On the other
hand, the ethical obligation is very broad and
attaches to all information that the client might
wish be held confidential.

4.

The privilege is restricted to lawyers. The
attorney-client privilege is available only for
communications with lawyers. There is no
accountant-client privilege. United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 104 S.Ct. 495 (1984). The
privilege for communications with an accountant
may be established if the accountant is retained
by an attorney for purposes of providing
assistance to the attorney. Bernardo v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. No. 33 (June 20, 1995).

TENSION WHERE THE OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY
RESTRICTS DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT FRAUD.
1.

The problem of client fraud. The broad obligation
of confidentiality sometimes creates tension
because the practitioner may feel the need to make
disclosure of information where the client acts in
a fraudulent or otherwise illegal manner.

2.

Guidance from the ABA rules. Some ABA Model Rules
restrict the lawyer in ways that may impinge on
the obligation of confidentiality.
a.

ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer
may not counsel or assist in conduct that is
criminal or fraudulent.

b.

Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) states that a lawyer
must withdraw from a representation that will
result in a violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law.

c.

Model Rule 1.16(b) states that the lawyer may
withdraw if the client persists in a course
of action that the lawyer reasonably believes

-
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to be criminal or fraudulent or if the client
has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate
a crime or fraud.
d.

Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) states that a lawyer
shall not knowingly fail to disclose a
material fact to a "tribunal" when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting in a criminal
or fraudulent act by the client.

e.

Model Rule 4.1(b) states that a lawyer shall
not fail to disclose a material fact to a
third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

3.

Only limited guidance provided. Note that only
Rule 3.3(a)(2) (disclosure to a tribunal)
expressly frees the lawyer from the obligation of
confidentiality established by Rule 1.6. In all
other situations, the lawyer is left with the need
to. reconcile the obligation of confidentiality
with the social pressure to disclose fraud.

4.

Dealing With This Tension In Tax Practice.
a.

ABA Opinion 314 provides guidance with
respect to certain aspects of practice before
the IRS.
(1) Opinion 314 concludes that proceedings
before the IRS are adversarial in nature
and that the IRS is thus not a
"tribunal" within the meaning of Rule
3.3(a)(2). Accordingly, there is no
duty to disclose client fraud to the
IRS, and, in this situation, the duty to
client trumps the duty to system.
(2) Opinion 314 appears to contemplate a
controversy representation before the
IRS- It is not clear that the same
result would follow if the matter were,
for example, the processing of a request
for private letter ruling. Would the
Service then be viewed as a tribunal?
Somewhere in between might lie the
representation of a taxpayer in
connection with a technical advice
request that arises out of an ongoing
audit of the taxpayer.
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(3) Opinion 314 also concludes that a lawyer
who represents a client before the IRS
may stress the strong points of the
client's case and is not required to
disclose weakness in that case. It also
states that the lawyer may not mislead
the IRS deliberately and affirmatively,
either by misstatements or by permitting
the client to mislead.
(4) Under Opinion 314, where a client has
made misstatements to the IRS, the
lawyer must counsel the client to
correct them, and may, if the client
refuses, have a duty to withdraw. The
lawyer may not, however, disclose the
misstatement without the client's
permission.
b.

ABA Opinion 92-366, which deals with a nontax
situation, holds that a lawyer must withdraw
from any representation where the client is
engaged in an ongoing fraud if the lawyer's
presence assists in that fraud.
(1) The withdrawing lawyer may disavow any
of the lawyer's work product that may be
used by the client to further the
continuing fraud even if that act may
have the collateral effect of disclosing
client confidences. This is known as a
"noisy withdrawal." In this situation,
involving ongoing fraudulent activity,
duty to the system trumps duty to the
client.
(2) Continuing fraud seems to require more
than a-past fraudulent act. If that
were not so, any prior fraudulent act
would justify a noisy withdrawal. Thus,
the concept of continuing fraud appears

to suggest new criminal activity, as
distinguished from efforts to avoid
detection of prior fraudulent conduct.
If, however, those efforts produce an
independent criminal activity, such as a
false statement (see 18 U.S.C. S 1001),
a continuing fraud might be present.
(3) If the client has committed a fraud that
is not a continuing one, the lawyer may
withdraw but may not disavow his or her
work product.

-
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ABA Opinion 93-375 further elucidates these
principles in the context of a regulatory
agency examination of a client. Although the
agency involved in the opinion was not the
IRS, the same results would seem to follow in
an IRS examination. Under the opinion:
(1) The lawyer has a duty not to mislead
agency officials but has no duty to
disclose weaknesses in the client's case
or to reveal confidential information.
(2) The lawyer must conduct herself in a way
that does not assist in fraud by the
client on the agency.
(3) If the client has a duty to disclose
information to the agency, the lawyer
should counsel the client to make that
disclosure. If the client fails to do
so, the lawyer need not withdraw.
(4) If the client makes a misrepresentation
to the agency in the presence of the
lawyer, the lawyer is not required to
make a "noisy withdrawal" but is
obligated to counsel the client in
private to correct the
misrepresentation. If the client
refuses, the lawyer may have the
obligation to "climb the corporate
ladder" (i.e., to counsel the client's
superior if the client is an employee)
to secure a different result. The
lawyer may also be required under Model
Rule 1.16(b) to consider withdrawal.
(5) If the lawyer does not withdraw and is
asked directly by an agency
representative about the subject of the
misrepresentation, the lawyer's only
permissible option is to decline to
respond, regardless of the negative
inference that may be drawn from that
action. The lawyer should caution the
client in advance of any such meeting
about this possibility and the risks
presented by allowing the lawyer to
continue to function in this "impaired
state."

D.

E.
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CIRCULAR 230 AND THE OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY.

1.

Practitioner must advise client of omission. If a
practitioner discovers that a client has not
complied with the tax law or has made an error in
any document, the practitioner is required to
advise the client promptly of that fact. S 10.21.

2.
.

Practitioner disclosure not directed. Circular
230 does not require or permit disclosure of the
omission by the practitioner.

CAUTION CONCERNING DIFFERENT RULES IN DIFFERENT
JURISDICTIONS.
1.

ABA Rules are advisory only. The ABA Model Rules
and opinions interpreting the rules have no
operative effect unless and until they are adopted
by admitting courts.

2.

Variations in different jurisdictions. Some of
the ABA Model Rules regarding confidentiality,
disclosure, and withdrawal have been adopted in
widely varying forms among the various states.

3.

a.

In some states, the obligation of
confidentiality has been downgraded by
permitting the lawyer to make a noisy
withdrawal even in the absence of continuing
fraud.

b.

Still other states condition the obligation
of confidentiality by permitting the lawyer
to make disclosures that are necessary to
prevent financial fraud by a client.

Local knowledqe is essential. For these reasons,
it is imperative that a lawyer consult the form in
which the rules have been adopted in his or her
particular state.

-
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THE DUTY OF LOYALTY -- AVOIDING CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

A.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST. ABA Model Rule 1.7 and Circular
230 S 10.29 both require that a lawyer avoid
representation of conflicting interests. This rule
relates to present clients and prior clients, and it
generally precludes a lawyer from representing a client
in a proceeding where the lawyer will be an essential
witness.

B.

TAX COURT RULE 24(f). Tax Court Rule 24(f) requires a
lawyer (1) who was involved in planning or promoting a
transaction or operating an entity connected to an
issue in a case, (2) who represents more than one
person with differing interests in a case, or (3) who
may be a witness in a case, to (a) secure informed
consent of the client (but only as to (1) and (2)), (b)
withdraw, or (c) take whatever other steps are
necessary to obviate a conflict of interest or other
violation of the ABA Model Rules.

C.

CLIENT WAIVER OF CONFLICT.
1.

Client waivers permitted. Generally, affected
clients may waive the protection of the conflict
rule and consent to the representation. However,
the court ultimately must approve conflict
situations, particularly those involving the
lawyer as a witness.

2.

Informed client required. Before the client is
asked to consent, the client must be fully
informed of the risks of continued representation
of conflicting interests.

3.

Lawyer's belief important. Under the ABA rule, a
lawyer must also reasonably believe that the
representation will not be adversely affected by
the conflict.

D.

CONFLICTS AND FORMER CLIENTS. ABA Model Rule 1.9
provides that, unless a former client consents, a
lawyer may not accept a representation adverse to the
interest of the former client if the subject matter is
substantially related to the former representation.

E.

ISSUE CONFLICTS.
1.

ABA Formal Opinion 93-377. This opinion deals
with "issue conflicts," i.e., situations in which
a lawyer, already engaged to represent one client
on a matter, accepts representation of a second
client who seeks a contrary result on the same
issue.

-
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3.

VI.
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Client consent permitted. Where there is
substantial risk that representation of one client
may result in a precedent that may undercut the
legal position of the other client, or that the
effectiveness of the representation of one client
will be materially limited by the representation
of the other, disclosure to and consent of both
clients is required.
consent not permitted. If the lawyer
believes that one representation will be adversely
affected by the other, the conflict cannot be
cured by the client's consent. The lawyer must
withdraw from one of the representations.

-'Client

THE DUTY OF COMPETENCE.
A.

THE GENERAL OBLIGATION OF COMPETENCE. ABA Model Rule
1.1 requires that a lawyer provide competent
representation to a client.

B.

LEVEL OF COMPETENCE REQUIRED. The text of the rule
states that competent representation requires "the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation."

VII. THE AMOUNT AND NATURE OF FEES.
A.

FEES MUST BE REASONABLE. ABA Model Rule 1.5(a)
requires that a lawyer's fee be reasonable. Circular
230, S 10.28, prohibits a practitioner from charging an
unconscionable fee for any matter before the IRS.

B.

CONTINGENT FEES.
1.

The ABA Rules. ABA Model Rule 1.5(d) prohibits
contingent fees in certain types of cases but does
not mention tax cases.

2.

The Circular 230 rule. Circular 230, S 10.28
prohibits the charging of a contingent fee for
preparation of a return. It allows a contingent
fee to be charged for an amended return or a claim
for refund where it is reasonably anticipated that
the amended return or claim will receive
substantive attention by the IRS.

VIII.DEALING WITH TAX PRACTICE STANDARDS IN DAY-TO-DAY TAX
PRACTICE.

A.

SITUATION NO. 1.
1.

Your client, a closely held corporation, is
considering a plan to refinance certain
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outstanding indebtedness. The plan would achieve
modest business savings but would also
substantially reduce the company's income tax
liabilities for several years. The plan would
require that the company take a position on its
return that is contrary to a regulation. The
company advises you that it has studied the
regulation carefully and believes that it is not
valid because it incorrectly interprets the
controlling statute. The company asks you to
review the matter and advise it with respect to
adopting the plan and adopting a tax return with
respect to the plan.
2.

You research the matter and learn that several
law review articles criticize the regulation and
question its validity. In addition, one Federal
district court case held the regulation invalid,
but the case was reversed on other grounds by the
U.S. court of appeals for that circuit. Your
client is not located in that particular district
or circuit. Upon finishing your research, you
conclude that the taxpayer's proposed position
would probably lose if it were challenged by the
Service. However, you believe that the taxpayer's
odds of prevailing are somewhere between 20 and 30
percent.

3.

Before reporting back to the taxpayer, you ponder
the situation. If you advise the taxpayer to
adopt the proposed return position, what risks do
you face? Are you an income tax return preparer?
If so, does that status put you in a position of
risk? What are those risks? How can they be
ameliorated? Are your interests consistent with
those of your client? Would adequate disclosure
of the return position by your client on the
return affect your exposure?

4.

If the client adopts the position in question with
your advice and concurrence, what risks does the
client face? How can those risks be ameliorated?
Is the negligence penalty implicated? The
disregard penalty? The substantial understatement
penalty? How would adequate disclosure affect the
client's exposure to penalty liability?

-
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5.

Is there an opportunity for the client to escape
penalty risk by reason of the reasonable cause and
good faith exception? What would that require?

6.

After digesting this information, you discuss it
with the client. After hearing you out, the
client advises you that it desires to adopt the
return position in question, that it does not
choose to make adequate disclosure of the position
on the return, and that it wants a written opinion
from you expressing your professional views. How
do you respond?

7.

The taxpayer asks you to explain the IRS
examination procedure, including the probability
that its return may be examined. How do you
respond to this request?

8.

The taxpayer files its return, reporting the
position in question. One year later, the
management of the tax department changes, and a
new tax director, who is risk averse, concludes
that the company should not be exposed to any
penalty risks. The tax director consults you and
asks if the company can file an amended return,
pay any tax attributable to the reversal of the
position in question, and thereby avoid penalty
risk. How do you advise?

SITUATION NO. 2.
1.

You have advised a closely-held corporation for
some years with respect to tax matters. The
business was created by the sole shareholder, X,
who remains active but is ready to withdraw.
There are two officers, A and B, who currently
handle most of the business affairs. X wants to
retire and sell the business to A and B. The
business is X's principal asset, and its purchase
would be a major commitment for both A and B. A
is a veteran of the business and knows it well.
B is X's nephew and, while intelligent and well
educated, is not experienced in business matters.
X, A, and B approach you concerning the sale and
ask that you represent them with respect to the
transaction. Are you prepared to move forward
with this representation?

-
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The sale transaction is completed, and several
years later the Service, in auditing the
corporation, questions the tax character of the
deal, proposing adjustments that would increase
the tax liability of the corporation and that of A
and B. You represent the interests of the
corporation as well as A and B before the Service,
and the case moves to the Tax Court. In the Tax
Court, the Government moves to disqualify you as
counsel under Tax Court Rule 24(f) on the ground
that you were involved in planning the transaction
and on the additional ground that you will be a
necessary witness. How should the court rule?

SITUATION NO. 3.
1.

You represent the sole proprietor of a business
that is being audited by the Service. You are
making good progress with the agent on the matters
that have been raised by the Service. In the
course of gathering information requested by the
agent, you become aware of the fact that the
client neglected to report a capital gain that was
realized in the year under audit. While there is
no doubt that a gain was realized, you conclude
that the nonreporting was a result of error rather
than an intent to evade tax liability. You call
this error to the attention of the client, who
asks you if he is obligated to correct it. He
also asks if he will violate any law by not doing
so. Then he asks if you can continue to represent
him in the audit if he does not disclose the
error. How do you respond to these questions?

2.

The audit proceeds through the protest stage, and
you and your client attend a conference in
appeals. There is one large unresolved issue.
The appeals officer raises a new point and states
that, if the facts are of a particular nature, she
would be inclined to find in favor of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer, without consulting with
you, tells the appeals officer that the facts are
as described by the appeals officer. This
surprises you somewhat because you thought that
the facts were otherwise. However, you remain
silent, and the appeals officer then states that
she will resolve the case in favor of the
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taxpayer. After leaving the IRS office, you
convey your surprise to the taxpayer, who admits
that he fabricated his response to the appeals
officer. What do you do? Should you have
intervened when the taxpayer misstated the facts?

